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Abstract

There is a growing trend across the world to adopt Performance Based
Contracting strategies to support logistics systems. Using these policies, contract
payments are strongly related to the performance achieved compared to prespecified
metrics. However, managers are not always confident on what are the most suitable
performance goals to use in these agreements. As a consequence, contractors struggle to
deliver the desired performance results, while aircraft fleets experience an increase in
support costs. In addition, when the results are inadequate, leaders are tempted to impose
even stricter performance targets to contractors, willing to exercise more control over the
support organization.
In this research, simulation is used to provide the quantitative evidence of how
sensitive life support costs are to adding metrics to a Performance Based Contract, with a
focus on changes in turnaround times and repair costs, for different logistical
configurations. The study acknowledges the potential risk of adding intermediate metrics
to these contracts, which possibly will only raise life support costs without a positive
effect on the main objectives of a fleet: mission readiness or simply availability. Ultimate
negative effects on contractors are also discussed and recommendations are provided to
managers on how they could design more successful performance-based contracts.
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I. Introduction

Background
Logistics support strategies have been shifted from transaction-based approaches,
in which contractors are used to satisfy specific demands and receive pre-specified
payments for their services, to Performance-Based Logistics (PBL), wherein a true
partnership amongst costumer and contractor must take place, which would bring benefits
to both parties.
PBL has developed as a strategy for enhancing the performance and reducing the
cost to sustain complex systems during the post production phase of their life-cycle,
which often tops, by two or three times, the expenses verified in the development and
production phases (Randall et al., 2010). While many papers use PBL as a synonym for
Performance-Based Contracting (PBC), the latter technically refer to an instrument to
achieve the former. PBC is a method of contracting designed to ensure that the essential
levels of quality of performance are achieved and their payments are related to the degree
to which the results meet the criteria of the contract (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016).
Across the world, there is a growing trend a to adopt Performance Based
Contracting strategies to support logistics systems, so that contract payments are strongly
related to the performance achieved compared to prespecified metrics. Nevertheless,
managers are not always convinced on what are the most appropriate performance goals
to use in such agreements. Consequently, contractors struggle to provide the required
performance outcomes, whilst aircraft fleets may face an increase in support costs.
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The current preferred product maintenance strategy to improve Department of
Defense (DoD) weapon systems readiness is the PBL (Gardner et al., 2015). At the same
time, there is evidence of decreasing performance in USAF mission-capable rates, as can
be seen in Figure 1.

USAF - Mission Capable Rates (entire fleet)

74%
73.7%

73%

73.1%
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72.1%

71.3%

71%
70%
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2016

2017

Figure 1. USAF Mission Capable Rates 2014-2017 - Adapted from Losey (2018)
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Figure 2. USAF Budget FY 2013-2020 - Adapted from Air Force Magazine (2019)
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In addition, Figure 2 reveals that, in recent years, not only has the budget for
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) grown in absolute numbers, but its share has also
been reduced in relation to the total budget, indicating pressure for the use of an
increasingly smaller slice of available resources in sustainment activities.
Faced with this challenging scenario, an opportunity arises to discuss possible
reasons for these obstacles that are being encountered. Therefore, in this study potential
issues regarding Performance-Based Contracting will be clarified, given the major role
that this approach plays in the maintenance of these combat platforms.
Problem Statement
In Performance-Based Contracting, results are driven by high-level goals
discussed before the contract was established. But when the results provided by PBC are
inadequate, logistics managers are tempted to enforce even more performance targets to
contractors, eager to exercise more influence over the support structure.
Given the complexity inherent in the logistics chain of an aircraft fleet, it is
impossible to have a clear idea of the effects of such potential changes, and considering
the high-pressure environment and the permanent search for better and faster results,
these consequences may be overlooked. Therefore, leaders need beforehand to have a
general knowledge about the mechanisms related to this type of event, enabling more
appropriate and well-founded decisions.
For this reason, the objective of this research is to provide evidence of how
sensitive life support costs can be to adding metrics to a Performance-Based Contract,
here focusing on changes in turnaround times and repair costs, for different logistical
configurations. The study will acknowledge the potential risk of adding intermediate
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metrics to these contracts, while also debating eventual negative effects on contractors.
At last, recommendations will be provided to managers on how they could design more
successful performance-based contracts.
Research Questions
In order to achieve the proposed objectives of this research, the following
research questions are offered:
Research Question (RQ): How sensitive are the Life Support Costs to the addition
of metrics in a Performance Based Contract?
Investigative Question 1 (IQ1): How does imposing a metric on the maximum
turn-around time to repair a component affect LSC?
Investigative Question 2 (IQ2): Are these possible effects more sensitive in
specific logistic configurations?
Methodology
Simulation will be used in this research to fulfill the objective of providing
quantitative evidence of how sensitive life support costs are to adding metrics to a
Performance-Based Contract, with a focus on changes in turnaround times and repair
costs, for different logistical configurations.
The Swedish software OPUS10 was chosen as the tool for this purpose,
considering its remarkable capabilities to model different support organizations and
implement a wide range of logistical parameters, presenting as a main result something
quite suitable for the objectives of this study: the cost/effectiveness curve, which will
inform each of the configurations that will provide better availability results for a given
life support cost.
4

Scope
This study will only address some very specific logistics support structures, as
will be discussed later, without using real data at any time. The goal here is to provide
indications to substantiate a reasoning that can be applied in similar real-world cases,
aiding to develop general concepts about the role metrics can play in Performance-Based
Contracts.
Assumptions and Limitations
The simulation model will assume different logistics scenarios with an initial
setup where the support organization is working with optimal performance for an
availability level of 80%, which would hardly represent the real world, given the very
dynamic environment in which an aircraft fleet is inserted, thus, it is unlikely that a
logistics system will be operating optimally.
Aircraft components will be the only items to fail in the model, but not the aircraft
itself. Workshops (from contractors) will be the only sites allowed to repair them, so
there will be no maintenance at the bases or depots, nor preventive or predictive
inspections. The only station authorized to store components will be the depot, so nothing
could be stocked on any base. Moreover, items will only be able to go up to the mother
station - from base to depot, and from depot to workshop - and vice-versa. Consequently,
there is no lateral support, nor cannibalization. Transportation times are considered fixed
and the same for shipping and returning items between stations.
Two sources of expenditures will sum up to calculate the life support costs
simulation model: repair costs, occurring when an item in fixed at a workshop after its
failure; and the acquisition costs, to purchase the necessary quantity of components to be
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allocated in each logistical configuration, which will guarantee the system's capacity to
reach the desired availability levels. Therefore, any other type of cost will not be included
in this analysis, such as storage costs, man-hours costs, depreciation costs, or
transportation costs.
Finally, only certain values of changes in TAT and RC will be modeled. So, any
other impact on the logistical configuration possibly caused by TAT reduction will not be
considered, just the possible effect on repair costs. In actual situations, if the logistics
system is operating with faster turnaround times, the depot will need to store fewer
components, reducing storage cost, for example. However, these additional effects will
not be taken into account in this study.
Significance of Research
Academia has plenty of research addressing Performance-Based Contracting, but
most of them intend to debate their possible benefits compared to conventional support
approaches. In addition to the smaller number of studies that evaluate the practical
challenges of PBC, quantitative studies in these areas are also lacking.
Thereby, this research will provide significant contribution helping to fill such
gap, providing quantitative evidence about the intrinsic mechanisms associated with
decisions on contract design, in order to offer measurable information to logistics leaders
concerning the adjacent effects on life support costs that the unreasonable imposition of
performance metrics can cause.
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II. Literature Review

Performance Based Logistics
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) is currently the main strategy used by the
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to enhance warfighter capability, reduce deployment
footprint, and reduce the cost of ownership, presenting new opportunities and challenges
(Coogan & Fellow, 2003). A more comprehensive definition from the DoD PBL
Guidebook (2016) is provided below:
PBL is an outcome-based support strategy that delivers an integrated,
affordable product support solution that satisfies warfighter requirements
while reducing Operating and Support (O&S) costs. When dealing with
industry, product support outcomes are acquired through performance-based
arrangements that deliver warfighter requirements and incentivize product
support providers to reduce costs through innovation.
Therefore, PBL is an instrument to combine acquisition and sustainment, applying
the best business practices to achieve better performance, guarantee mission readiness
and reduce costs. Data must be collected to ensure PBL attains the desired results, mainly
regarding costs and desired performance.
However, managers responsible for adopting such approach must be cautious,
because despite its possible benefits, noticeable risks are always involved. In the words of
Davis et al. (2016): “A PBL arrangement buys an affordable outcome that effectively
supports the warfighter requirements... if the agreement is structured correctly”.
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Drivers of PBL
Among the reasons why customers decide to adopt PBL agreements, Berkowitz et
al. (2003) list seven different factors, as given in Table 1.
Table 1: Drivers for PBL – Adapted from Berkowitz et al. (2003)
1. Rising cost of maintenance, operations and support for new and legacy missile systems
2. Needed tool for Logistics Transformation and other actions required by Government
3. Needed reduction of customer wait time in support of the warfighter
4. Needed modernization of weapon systems to enhance combat capability
5. Needed solutions to weapon obsolescence problems
6. Documented savings from commercial logistics support operations
7. Documented improvements from implementation of performance-based acquisition

It is worth mentioning that, in fact, one of the main purposes for adopting this
PBL strategy is that customers want to transfer the risk of output uncertainty to the
service provider, in the form of contract payment uncertainty (Kim et al., 2010).
The adoption of a PBL approach is mainly governed by the intention of aligning
customer and supplier objectives and incentives. Meeting these concerns together can be
tricky, though, especially when trying to align partners' views on risk and reward
distribution. A critical point is the relationship between the possible benefits of this
strategy and its costs, considering the possible design of complicated and expensive
measurement systems (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2015).
Total Cost of Ownership
The adoption of a strategic purchasing focus has been stimulated by a series of
recent trends that have focused on the quality of the purchase of materials and services,
on the rationalization of the supply base and on stimulating competition. Increasingly,
8

decisions involving acquisitions affect a large part of a company's total costs, whether in
terms of direct acquisition costs, but also in indirect costs, such as in the areas of
inventory management, quality control, and administration in general. Total Cost of
Ownership (TCO) is a tool to assess these indirect costs, establishing a more strategic
focus on purchasing and supply management (Hurkens et al., 2006).
When managing the logistics chain with a focus on TOC, it is possible to carry
out strategic planning that allows synergy between private suppliers and service providers
to meet military demands (Glas et al., 2013). Using this methodology, the negotiation of
performance standards is broader, aiming not only to reduce costs but also the
improvement of logistics performance factors, such as cycle times, hours needed for
maintenance work or even time between failures. In addition to reducing TOC through
lower amount of labor and inventories, the support system can also become more robust
in the face of eventual contingencies (Camm et al., 2004).
Therefore, complex logistical systems such as those related to military aircraft
fleets must carry out their planning, not only by looking at individual cost entities, but
using a TOC approach, which will allow the best global results to be obtained by making
the sustainment structure more cost efficient.
Life Cycle Costing
The tool commonly used to establish TCO is called the Life Cycle Costing, which
consists of a process of identifying and documenting all costs involved over the life of an
asset. LCC is the sum of all types of expenses in support of an item from its conception
and manufacture, throughout its operation, until the end of its useful life (Woodward,
1997).
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Expenses related to initial investments in a logistical support system correspond
to only a small part of all operating costs that will be incurred during its life span. Thus,
the life cycle technique is essential in Performance-Based Logistics, since, in general, an
air force's fleets will operate for decades (Glas et al., 2013).
The decrease in the life cycle cost can occur through the conversion of
transactional expenses year by year, from traditional maintenance, into large cost
reduction pools, which should be used to encourage investment in technology, material
and process that increases the reliability of the system, while maintaining its
performance. In a traditional approach, the customer generally does not have a capital
reserve in the current year to invest in reliability improvements, even though the life
cycle cost could present marked reductions (Nowicki et al., 2010).
There are some differences between the categories used by each author to define
the entire Life Cycle Cost. Figure 3 shows the formulation stated by Woodward (1997).

Figure 3. Life Cycle Costing formulation (Woodward, 1997)
10

In other work, Bengtsson & Kurdve (2016) divided the LCC between project
costs, acquisition costs, life support costs, and life operations costs. OPUS10 commonly
uses as an output the life support costs (LSC), given by the expected investment and
operating cost associated with the support system design (Hallin, 2015).
Performance Based Contracting
The literature uses a wide range of terms to refer to Performance-Based Logistics,
sometimes Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) is used as a synonym of PBL.
However, a more accurate and specific description is provided by (Hunter & Ellman,
2017):
Performance-based contracting is a type of contracting that calls for contracts
to be structured in such a way as to enable and reward better performance on
the part of the service provider or contractor.
In this type of contract, a specific focus is given to the specifications, no longer
ruling the processes of how the service will be executed, but rather emphasizing the
expected results for the service, whether in financial terms or any other type of positive
resulting impact. At least part of the supplier's payment must be linked to the
achievement of a given metric, making the supplier subject to greater financial risks
related to performance (Selviaridis & Norrman, 2015).
Datta & Roy (2013) also discuss that in PBC the option is made not to acquire the
possession of a product, but rather the result that it will bring. Therefore, compared to the
traditional contracting process, PBC provides a better alignment between risks and
incentives, and an adequate relationship between providers and customers is essential for
the success of the contract. However, as the final requirement is for the result of the
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service, it can be challenging to assess the quality of the service provided, associated with
the difficulty of standardizing production due to the continuous involvement of the
customer.
Best Practices
To fully meet the objectives of PBC, an accurate evaluation of current
performance in measurable terms must first be made, differentiating overall performance
in terms of Operational Availability (or some other expression of readiness) and a
measure of life support costs. These general performance metrics can be broken down
into lower-level metrics, such as reliability and supply lead times, and a clear definition
of the performance required by the final user is needed. Consequently, an appropriate
business type must define how to move performance from where it is to where it is
required by the warfighter, being able to evaluate a wide range of business options,
determining the cost and risk associated with each option. These options may involve
providing all support elements, such as maintenance supply support, training, in-service
engineering and technical documentation management. Finally, once the desired solution
is chosen and employed, the performance of the entire support range must be measured,
making the necessary modifications to accomplish the performance goals (Coogan &
Fellow, 2003).
A successful execution of a PBL agreement occurs through an iterative process, in
which it is important to produce consistent reports, communicate regularly with major
stakeholders and periodically review the performance of the contract. Some of the best
practices related to managing these arrangements include: perform an opening meeting
after contract award; ask for brief and informative contractor reports; quarterly review
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meetings direct with contractor; flexibility with Governance processes as contract
matures; understanding of PBL contract and contractor’s proposal; establishment of an
internal PBL management team and a Governance plan with external stakeholders (U.S.
DoD, 2016).
The literature indicates some key ideas regarding the impact of measurements in
the potential success of a PBL arrangement. Table 2 presents a set of prescriptions for
measurement that could be used to guide PBC design decisions:
Table 2: Measurement prescriptions for PBL agreements – Adapted from Doerr et al. (2004)

1

2

PBL should carry out less commercial sector participation if operational risk is
high or difficult to measure.

The duration of the contract should be shorter when commercial sector providers
undertake less (measurable) operational risk under contract.
Integrated weapon system models to support business case analysis should be used

3

when a PBL contract cover less than comprehensive logistical support for a
weapon system (e.g., for a component).
The metrics used for managing PBC should address valued outcomes and must be

4

associated to the cost, readiness and agility of the weapons system. Process
measures should be applied only when major operational decisions depend on the
status of the process itself.
In ongoing PBL contracts, operational risk (variability) in key performance

5

measures must be assessed, and variability reduction must be bolstered with
proper incentives, when critical to mission support.
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Incentive and Penalty Mechanisms
Gardner et al. (2015) concluded that the DoD may balance PBL contracts to
mitigate operational and financial risks, while simultaneously building long-term
partnerships that encourage investment from commercial contractors, concentrating
efforts in congressional funding methods (which are not compatible with PBL), using
contract’s option years to provide more flexibility (and maybe flexible performance),
improving incentives with increased use of profit sharing, making long-term contracts,
and also working towards fixed price/price-based contracts.
According to Datta & Roy (2013), contractor’s decision to share the cost of
uncertainty with the sub-suppliers helps to form the basis of sustainable success of
performance-based outsourcing contracts.
There are three key findings in the research of Hunter & Ellman (2017) regarding
incentives: contract length is the most powerful incentive; negative monetary incentives
are effective, even down to the subcontractor level; positive monetary incentives are not
seen as effective or desirable.
Talking about how to incentivize or penalize a contractor, Wååk & Sturgess
(2000) postulate that the adoption of penalty clauses requires good judgement, as the
contract can be harmed if possible sanctions could induce the contractor to go out of
business, given that in certain cases he would be the only one to be able to perform some
type of service. Unreasonable application of sanctions in these situations can lead to
unsolvable conflicts. The authors further suggest that the adoption of incentives should be
preferred, such as, for example, increasing a payment if repair turnaround times are
consistently hit.
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Another important aspect about sanctions in PBC is presented in the study by
Girth (2014), which states that the mere existence of contractual mechanisms to penalize
the service provider is not enough to hold them accountable in case of poor performance.
Among the factors that act against the accountability of the contract, the author points out
the amount of discretion managers select to use, the level of administrative burden related
with the sanction procedure, and the degree to which the purchasing organization is
reliant on the poor-performing contractor's expertise.
Determination of Good Metrics
Defining a metric that translates warfighter objectives is a fundamental activity
when choosing PBC. However, if such contracts are applied to specific subsystems or
components, the metrics must be adjusted to reflect the correct level of responsibility
delegated to the service provider, in order to seek the best consequence in the overall
objective of the weapons system. Such metrics are used in PBC to measure and evaluate
the effectiveness of the contracted logistics solution, which also allows any adjustments
to be made during the course of the contract. There is no way to identify a perfect metric,
but for each case, managers should seek to identify the most appropriate set of such
elements in order to encourage the improvement of the contractor's performance, while at
the same time meeting the requirements of the warfighter, which will result in a unique
service, of reduced cost and higher quality (U.S. Department of Defense, 2016).
In order to implement a PBL contract with consistent metrics, all parameters
considered in the contract should be analyzed in an integrated way. Some decisions can
influence the metrics discussed before in opposite directions, as example, a higher level

15

of inventory will result in higher availability as discussed before, but means higher cost
of supportability (Lopes et al., 2017).
Designing a performance-based contract, however, may be a daunting task for
managers tempted to control every component of the logistics chain, willing to add more
and more metrics in the agreement. Doerr et al. (2004) perfectly illustrate this dilemma
on their research, as follows:
(…) if we are engaged in an initiative to buy performance, (…) wouldn’t it
make more sense to measure only key outcomes, and measure them well?
When we first presented this idea at a conference, we were met with the
objection that an abundance of measures do not necessarily distract a decision
maker from key tasks. The analogy was drawn to a pilot in a jet, where the
cockpit has a superabundance of meters and instruments, almost all of which
can be ignored, except in the case of an emergency. The analogy is a telling
one, in that most of the people making decisions about metrics for PBL have
themselves been pilots, or ship captains, or in charge of some complex process
in the past. However, PBL is not supposed to present the DoD with a complex
process to manage – it is supposed to take one off the hands of the DoD. We
aren’t supposed to be flying the plane – we are supposed to be passengers.
When you are paying someone else to get you to your destination, you care
about the price of the ticket, and arriving on time.
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III. Methodology

Simulation as a logistics tool
Simulation approaches are ways to imitate the operation of real-world systems.
By creating a model representing characteristics, behaviors and functions of the selected
system or process, the simulation can represent the operation of the system over time.
This technique is able to yield near optimal solutions when it finds the values of the
system parameters that produce the desirable performance of the system. According to
Rogers (2002), simulation-based optimization is a method by which an optimization
engine offers the input components for the simulation program, which will go on and
present the results for a previously specified objective function. Until results are shown
for a satisfied solution or for termination due to prescribed conditions, the simulation
process will continue iteratively between the simulation program and the optimization
engine.
This methodology has long been supported in logistics applications, first, as an
instrument to recognize and calculate the enhanced operation performance, and, second,
as a tool to gain a sharper knowledge of the potential cost and performance of logistics
operations (Bowersox & Closs, 1989). Because many logistics processes are not easily
analytically traceable, simulation brings an advantage over analytical methods such as
better understanding of complex systems and experiments of various systems.
In this context, computer simulation is growing in popularity as an approach for
organizational researchers, which allows them to take the inherent complexity of
organizational systems and to focus on “what-if” analysis, while other research methods
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must make various assumptions about the exact cause and effect nature of the system
under study. In fact, the key strength of simulation is its ability to support the
investigation of phenomena that are difficult to study using conventional analytical
methods.
OPUS10 Software
In order to provide a novel analysis and a different perspective to the evaluation
of possible changes on PBC performance goals, a versatile simulation tool must be
chosen, with adequate capabilities to provide an insightful analysis. These requirements
are well fulfilled by OPUS10, a comprehensive computer program developed by the
Swedish company Systecon, with its main focus in logistics support and spares
optimization.
According to Systecon (n.d.), OPUS 10 provides realistic modeling of technology
and support solutions, rapid calculations, and results that significantly reduce the spare
part investment while increasing system availability. It also provides indispensable
decision support in a wide range of situations, like optimizing the entire maintenance
concept or evaluating and comparing alternative support solutions. In addition, since it is
scalable and flexible, it can handle smaller scenarios with a handful of components and a
few locations to large programs with thousands of components and a complex support
solution. The effective optimization algorithms make that even large cases can be
optimized in seconds.
Several academic studies have been successful in assessing this tool for a wide
range of logistics systems applications, as can be seen in Wu & Hsu (2008), Wijk &
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Andersson (2012), (Tysseland, 2009), Lindqvist & Lundin (2010), Karlsson (2015) and
Bussche (2019), among others.
OPUS10 assumes stationary conditions and that spare part demand at the
operational bases can be approximated as a Poisson process. By default, the VariMETRIC (Multi-Indenture and Multi-Echelon Technique for Recoverable Item Control)
method is used, with METRIC being optional. It should also be noted that while the
formulas used by OPUS10 are based on these inventory theories, they have seen
considerable advancements over the years, resulting in more accurate estimates
(Karlsson, 2015). However, complete and adequate descriptions of all variables
considered by the cited software are not part of the scope of this research and, therefore,
will not be assessed.
Data Used as Input
This study mainly intends to evaluate the effects on life support costs due to the
addition of metrics, or performance goals, in a PBL agreement. In this way, it would not
be feasible to get real data for this kind of analysis, considering the inherent
characteristics of an Air Force’s operations. Information regarding cost raises due to
faster return requirements imposed to contractors would also be extremely difficult to
measure accurately, and would require a thorough study beyond the objectives of this
research.
The scope of this investigation, in fact, comprehends the evaluation of different
scenarios and values to determine a range of possible outcomes, given the limited data
available. In this way, managers will be able to make the most informed decision when
facing similar circumstances. For these reasons, the use of real data to evaluate the
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logistical mechanisms involved in the simulations is not needed: the key here is to
understand, in general, how sensitive are the life support costs to metric changes in a
contract based on performance.
Therefore, this examination will consider a scenario with only one type of
operating aircraft, defined as BR-AIRCRAFT, in a time span of five years. The annual
utilization factor is defined as 0.290, resulting in 2,540 flight hours per aircraft in one
year. Only failures on components will be considered (not in the system), and each
system will have the item structure given shown in Figure 4, meaning that one aircraft is
composed by 2 engines, 1 APU, 2 pumps, and so on. Another common feature for all
models to be tested is showed on Figure 5, which provides unit prices and failure rates for
each component. The failure rate (FRT) is given as the number of expected failures over
a million of operating hours: thus, the engine FRT is defined as 0.00011 failures per
operating hour (110 failures divided by 1,000,000 hours), for example.

Figure 4. OPUS10 Input Table: Materiel/ItemStructure – Quantities of items per system
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Figure 5. OPUS10 Input Table: Materiel/Item – Unit prices and failure rates per item

Scenarios to be simulated
One of the objectives of this research is to verify if PBC metrics changes will
eventually be more impactful in costs for specific logistical configurations. Consequently,
five different logistics scenarios will be proposed for simulation, according to Table 3.
Each scenario will have a different combination of the number of operational bases (sites
where aircrafts operate), depots (locations where failed items are sent from the
operational bases, and where repaired components are shipped after maintenance) and
workshops (repair centers) available.
For scenarios with more than one depot or workshop, specific groups of
components were defined, to enable the particular flows of items through the distribution
and repair sites, as identified in Table 4.
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Table 3: Logistics scenarios to be tested in OPUS10
Scenario name

Basic
Logistics Scenario

Scenario Number of Number of Number of
acronym Workshops Depots
Bases

BLS

1

1

Details

2

12 aircrafts operating on “Near Base”,
6 aircrafts operating on “Far Base”

Alternative Logistics
ALS1
Scenario 01

1

1

3

6 aircrafts operating on “Near Base”,
6 aircrafts operating on “Far Base”,
6 aircrafts operating on “Even Far Base”

Alternative Logistics
ALS2
Scenario 02

1

2

2

Similar as BLS, but with
Group 1 items going to Near Depot,
Group 2 items going to Far Depot

Alternative Logistics
ALS3
Scenario 03

2

1

2

Similar as BLS, but with
Group 3 items repaired in Near Workshop,
Group 4 items repaired in Far Workshop

3

Similar as ALS1, but with
Group 1 items going to Near Depot,
Group 2 items going to Far Depot,
Group 3 items repaired in Near Workshop,
Group 4 items repaired in Far Workshop

Alternative Logistics
ALS4
Scenario 04

2

2

Table 4: Specific groups for each component, when required
Item

Depot Group

Workshop Group

ENGINE

Group 3

APU

Group 4

CSD

Group 1

Group 3

PUMP

Group 4

FCU

Group 3

STAB CTRL

Group 4

GYRO VERT

Group 3

DOOR MLG

Group 2

Group 4

PITCH COMP

Group 3

FLAP ACT

Group 4
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Basic Logistics Scenario (BLS)
An illustration of a possible logistics configuration for the first scenario is shown
in Figure 6, containing the transportation times to move items between each site. Figure 7
shows the resultant input model in OPUS10.

Figure 6. Positioning and transportation times for the first scenario (BLS)

Figure 7. OPUS10 station structure for the first scenario (BLS) - both transportation times
between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 01 (ALS1)
Likewise, the second scenario can have its possible logistics configuration
represented as shown in Figure 8, covering the transportation times to transfer items
between each location. The resulting OPUS10 input model is given by Figure 9.

Figure 8. Positioning and transportation times for the second scenario (ALS1)

Figure 9. OPUS10 station structure for the second scenario (ALS1) - both transportation
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 02 (ALS2)
An example of a feasible logistics configuration for the third setup is
demonstrated in Figure 10, including the transportation times to relocate items between
each station. Figure 11 presents the resulting input model in OPUS10.

Figure 10. Positioning and transportation times for the third scenario (ALS2)

Figure 11. OPUS10 station structure for the third scenario (ALS2) - both transportation
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 03 (ALS3)
Similarly, the fourth situation can have its potential logistics configuration
characterized as displayed in Figure 12, comprising the transportation times to move
items among each site. The resulting OPUS10 input model is provided by Figure 13.

Figure 12. Positioning and transportation times for the fourth scenario (ALS3)

Figure 13. OPUS10 station structure for the fourth scenario (ALS3) - both transportation
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same
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Alternative Logistics Scenario 04 (ALS4)
At last, a representation of a possible logistics configuration for the fifth scenario
is exhibited in Figure 14, containing the transportation times to relocate items amongst
each station. Figure 15 shows the subsequent input model in OPUS10.

Figure 14. Positioning and transportation times for the fifth scenario (ALS4)

Figure 15. OPUS10 station structure for the fifth scenario (ALS4) - both transportation
times between stations (to send and return components) are considered the same
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Changes on Repair Times and Costs induced by PBC Metrics in Each Scenario
Having defined all possible logistical designs, the potential changes that could be
introduced in those scenarios due to performance requirements will now be introduced.
In this study, initially a logistics configuration operating with optimal
performance is being considered, with an availability level of 80% for the fleet. In other
words, before any specific intermediate requirement to be set by a future contract, the
logistics system is operating in the best possible way and providing the desired output of
80% availability. In such condition, the simulation will assume the following values of
turnaround time (TAT) and Repair Costs (RC), showed in Table 5. The initial value for
the latter was defined as 25% of the unit price, for all items.
Table 5: Turnaround Times and Repair Costs in the initial condition and at 80% availability level

Item
ENGINE
APU
CSD
PUMP
FCU
STAB CTRL
GYRO VERT
DOOR MLG
PITCH COMP
FLAP ACT

Direct Repair TAT*
(hours)
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000

Direct RC
($)
10000
1500
2500
100
1000
2000
200
300
400
600

*The Repair TAT here is not considering transportation times between stations,
only the time spent in the workshop to repair, for simplification purposes.

Starting from this point, high-level fleet managers make the decision to apply a
PBC sustainment strategy to support that fleet. However, in an attempt to tie the
contractor to some performance goals that could help them to achieve the desired
supporting objectives, an intermediary metric is established in regard to the maximum
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turnaround time allowed to the contractor to return a component after receiving it for
repair.
As can be observed in Table 5, the initial condition of the simulation (which is
considered to provide optimal performance regarding availability) shows different TAT
values for each component. In an actual support organization, anyone would intuitively
expect these values to be even sparser, with each item having its own intrinsic TAT to
obtain an optimal output in a logistics configuration, since they all have different repair
prices, stock sizes, among others.
Therefore, when a metric such as maximum allowable TAT is imposed on a
performance-based contract, a certain degree of adjustment in several logistical
parameters will definitely be needed to accommodate this change. In this research, it will
be analyzed the impact on only one factor certainly affected by the need to reduce TAT:
the repair cost. If shorter times are required, a higher cost will be charged to meet this
demand.
In this study, the imposition of faster TAT will be simulated by applying the same
percentage drop to all original times defined in the initial condition of the support
structure. Thus, simulations will run contemplating reductions of 20% and 40% in
turnaround times, modeling the effect of the imposition of a TAT metric on a logistics
system that was operating in its optimal performance condition. For each of these TAT
decreases, three different possible consequences on repair costs will be checked:
increases of 5%, 10% and 15% in maintenance expenses.
Table 6 displays all the values that will be used as inputs, given the proposed
changes discussed above.
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Table 6: Values to be tested due to TAT reductions and RC increases
Initial Condition

Item
ENGINE
APU
CSD
PUMP
FCU
STAB CTRL
GYRO VERT
DOOR MLG
PITCH COMP
FLAP ACT

Direct
Repair
TAT
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000
2000
1000

Direct
Repair
Cost

TAT reductions
to be simulated

Possibilities of increase in
Repair Cost for each TAT reduction

20% lower 40% lower
Repair TAT Repair TAT

5% higher 10% higher 15% higher
Repair Cost Repair Cost Repair Cost

10000
1500
2500
100
1000
2000
200
300
400
600

1600
800
1600
800
1600
800
1600
800
1600
800

1200
600
1200
600
1200
600
1200
600
1200
600

10500
1575
2625
105
1050
2100
210
315
420
630

11000
1650
2750
110
1100
2200
220
330
440
660

11500
1725
2875
115
1150
2300
230
345
460
690

Model Assumptions and Limitations
The model proposed for this simulation is assuming an initial condition where the
support organization is operating with optimal performance for a desired fleet availability
level. In the real world, a logistics system is unlikely to operate optimally, given the
extremely dynamic environment in which an aircraft fleet is inserted.
Only failures in components are being modeled, not in the aircraft itself, and the
only possibility of repairing a failed item is by sending it to a workshop, so there is no
possible repair on the bases or depots. Consequently, preventive or predictive
maintenance are not being taken into account in this study.
The only station authorized to stock components is the depot, thus nothing can be
stored on any base. Also, items can only go up to the mother station - from base to depot,
and from depot to workshop - and vice-versa. Therefore, there is no lateral support, nor
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cannibalization. Transportation times are considered the same for sending and returning
items between stations.
The only expenditure sources are the repair costs, to fix an item in a workshop
after its failure, and the acquisition costs to purchase the necessary quantity of
components to be allocated in each logistical configuration, which will guarantee the
system's capacity to reach the desired availability levels. Thus, several other costs are not
included in this analysis, such as storage costs, man-hours costs, transportation costs,
depreciation costs, among others.
Furthermore, only specific levels of changes in TAT and RC are being modeled.
Any other effect in the logistical configuration due to a TAT reduction is not taken into
account, only the possible impact on repair costs. For example, if the system experiences
faster turnaround times, fewer items will be stored in the depot and storage costs may be
reduced. Also, transportation times between stations are not being included in these TAT
changes, for simplification purposes. As they are much lower than the time spent
repairing items in the workshop, we consider that this assumption will not affect the
analysis.
Experiments Simulated
In the previous paragraphs, the five logistical configurations to be simulated were
defined, as well as the changes in TAT and repair costs to be implemented in each of
them, starting from an initial condition with optimal performance. However, it is also
important to clarify more specifically how these changes will be gradually introduced
into the simulation model.
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For each logistics scenario, first all input data previously stated will be inserted,
and the main output generated by running the model using OPUS10 will be a
cost/effectiveness (C/E) chart like the one illustrated in Figure 16, showing all the
optimal availability levels for each amount of resources – the life support costs (LSC) - to
be invested in supporting the fleet’s life cycle. However, from the theory of inventory
management, it is known that such graph is not a continuous curve, but a boundary
created by the connection of several discrete points, each of them corresponding to a
unique quantity of stock allocation among the components existing in the support
organization.

Figure 16. Cost/Effectiveness (C/E) curve given as output by OPUS10 (Systecon, n.d.)

The first output generated for each scenario will show the optimal
cost/availability points for a system with the entries presented in Table 3. But the focus is
on the point where availability reaches the target level of 80%. As discussed, that is not a
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continuous curve, so the point closest to the availability objective will be chosen, and, for
this selection, there will be an unequivocal stock allocation associated with it.
This assortment of items will be the starting point for the next simulation run. The
problem type will be changed from INITIAL (a short for Initial Procurement) to
ANALYSIS in the OPUS10 input table Program Control/ControlParameters, as shown
to Figure 17. In addition, the possibilities of TAT reductions and increases in repair costs
will be included in the model. In this way, running the model will now provide
information about LSC and the availability inherent in that specific configuration. This
will be a point solution, and not a curve as in the first step. And considering the proposed
simulation parameters, it is possible to postulate that a higher availability could be
achieved, since the turnaround times will decrease, but also the life support costs will
grow, given the increases in repair costs.

Figure 17. Change of problem type to ANALYSIS in OPUS10 to evaluate life support
costs and availability for a given assortment of items

Nevertheless, there is still a need to evaluate if the point obtained in the previous
step is in the optimal availability/costs boundary for that mixture of TAT/RC, and which
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would be the optimal LSC value and stock allocation associated with this combination for
an availability level of 80%. So, in this second step, the problem type will again be set as
INITIAL, and the output will be the optimal frontier curve of availability versus LSC.
And then, running the simulation and obtaining this latest boundary, it will be
possible to find the new optimal stock allocation for 80% availability. Compared with the
previous step, the latter assortment of items will be reduced in quantities, making it
possible to decrease LSC, although some efficiency is also lost.
As there are three different possibilities for changes in RC for each of the two
TAT reductions to be tested, a total of six combinations will be verified with these exam
levels. Since each of these combinations requires two steps/simulations runs to be
assessed, and counting with the first simulation run for the initial logistical condition, a
total of thirteen simulation runs will be needed to evaluate each logistics scenario, as
listed in Table 7.
Table 7: List of thirteen simulation runs to evaluate each logistics scenario
#
Configuration
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

For Each Scenario:
Optimal Stock Allocation (OSA) for 80% Availability
OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 5% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T05C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability

OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 10% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T10C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability

OSA with 20% lower repair TAT, 15% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 20T15C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability

OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 5% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T05C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability

OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 10% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T10C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability

OSA with 40% lower repair TAT, 15% higher repair costs
New Optimal Stock Allocation with 40T15C, reducing stock allocation to 80% availability
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Sub-Scenario
Acronym
OSA%80
20T05C+80
20T05C%80
20T10C+80
20T10C%80
20T15C+80
20T15C%80
40T05C+80
40T05C%80
40T10C+80
40T10C%80
40T15C+80
40T15C%80

IV. Results and Analysis

Comparative Results within Each Scenario
Using the guidelines presented before, all OPUS10 simulation runs were done for
each of the logistics configurations, and the results are summarized from Tables 8 to 12.
It is imperative to mention that, according to the methodology previously proposed, every
row in these tables corresponding to Simulation Identifiers ending in odd numbers should
present information regarding an availability level of 80%. However, since the
Cost/Effectiveness curve given by OPUS10 is not a continuous line, the closest point to
the availability objective was chosen, as discussed earlier.
Table 8: Numerical results obtained in BLS for each simulation run in OPUS10
Scenario Name

Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym
BLS-1:OSA%80
BLS-2:20T05C+80
BLS-3:20T05C%80
BLS-4:20T10C+80
BLS-5:20T10C%80
Basic Logistics Scenario BLS-6:20T15C+80
BLS-7:20T15C%80
(BLS)
BLS-8:40T05C+80
BLS-9:40T05C%80
BLS-10:40T10C+80
BLS-11:40T10C%80
BLS-12:40T15C+80
BLS-13:40T15C%80

Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT
A1
0%
0%
A2
5%
-20%
A3
5%
-20%
A4
10%
-20%
A5
10%
-20%
A6
15%
-20%
A7
15%
-20%
A8
5%
-40%
A9
5%
-40%
A10
10%
-40%
A11
10%
-40%
A12
15%
-40%
A13
15%
-40%

LSC ($)
1598282.00
1668415.92
1619615.92
1738550.02
1689750.02
1808684.11
1759884.11
1668415.92
1580815.92
1738550.02
1650950.02
1808684.11
1721084.11

%Δ LSC
0.00%
4.39%
1.33%
8.78%
5.72%
13.16%
10.11%
4.39%
-1.09%
8.78%
3.30%
13.16%
7.68%

Availability %Δ Avail.
79.98%
0.00%
84.64%
4.66%
79.91%
-0.07%
84.64%
4.66%
79.91%
-0.07%
84.64%
4.66%
79.91%
-0.07%
88.07%
8.09%
80.88%
0.90%
88.07%
8.09%
80.88%
0.90%
88.07%
8.09%
80.88%
0.90%

Table 9: Numerical results obtained in ALS1 for each simulation run in OPUS10
Scenario Name

Alternative Logistics
Scenario 01 (ALS1)

Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym
ALS1-1:OSA%80
ALS1-2:20T05C+80
ALS1-3:20T05C%80
ALS1-4:20T10C+80
ALS1-5:20T10C%80
ALS1-6:20T15C+80
ALS1-7:20T15C%80
ALS1-8:40T05C+80
ALS1-9:40T05C%80
ALS1-10:40T10C+80
ALS1-11:40T10C%80
ALS1-12:40T15C+80
ALS1-13:40T15C%80

Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT
B1
0%
0%
B2
5%
-20%
B3
5%
-20%
B4
10%
-20%
B5
10%
-20%
B6
15%
-20%
B7
15%
-20%
B8
5%
-40%
B9
5%
-40%
B10
10%
-40%
B11
10%
-40%
B12
15%
-40%
B13
15%
-40%

LSC ($)
1610681.85
1680815.94
1629615.94
1750950.03
1699750.03
1821084.12
1769884.12
1680815.94
1582415.94
1750950.03
1652550.03
1821084.12
1722684.12

%Δ LSC
0.00%
4.35%
1.18%
8.71%
5.53%
13.06%
9.88%
4.35%
-1.75%
8.71%
2.60%
13.06%
6.95%

Availability %Δ Avail.
79.62%
0.00%
83.63%
4.01%
79.63%
0.01%
83.63%
4.01%
79.63%
0.01%
83.63%
4.01%
79.63%
0.01%
86.61%
6.99%
79.49%
-0.13%
86.61%
6.99%
79.49%
-0.13%
86.61%
6.99%
79.49%
-0.13%

Table 10: Numerical results obtained in ALS2 for each simulation run in OPUS10
Scenario Name

Alternative Logistics
Scenario 02 (ALS2)

Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym
ALS2-1:OSA%80
ALS2-2:20T05C+80
ALS2-3:20T05C%80
ALS2-4:20T10C+80
ALS2-5:20T10C%80
ALS2-6:20T15C+80
ALS2-7:20T15C%80
ALS2-8:40T05C+80
ALS2-9:40T05C%80
ALS2-10:40T10C+80
ALS2-11:40T10C%80
ALS2-12:40T15C+80
ALS2-13:40T15C%80

Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT
C1
0%
0%
C2
5%
-20%
C3
5%
-20%
C4
10%
-20%
C5
10%
-20%
C6
15%
-20%
C7
15%
-20%
C8
5%
-40%
C9
5%
-40%
C10
10%
-40%
C11
10%
-40%
C12
15%
-40%
C13
15%
-40%
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LSC ($)
1614282.00
1680815.92
1637615.92
1754950.02
1707750.02
1825084.11
1777884.11
1684815.92
1590415.92
1754950.02
1660550.02
1825084.11
1734284.11

%Δ LSC
0.00%
4.12%
1.45%
8.71%
5.79%
13.06%
10.13%
4.37%
-1.48%
8.71%
2.87%
13.06%
7.43%

Availability %Δ Avail.
79.00%
0.00%
82.68%
3.68%
79.58%
0.58%
82.83%
3.83%
79.58%
0.58%
82.83%
3.83%
79.58%
0.58%
85.69%
6.69%
79.86%
0.86%
85.69%
6.69%
79.86%
0.86%
85.69%
6.69%
79.25%
0.25%

Table 11: Numerical results obtained in ALS3 for each simulation run in OPUS10
Scenario Name

Alternative Logistics
Scenario 03 (ALS3)

Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym
ALS3-1:OSA%80
ALS3-2:20T05C+80
ALS3-3:20T05C%80
ALS3-4:20T10C+80
ALS3-5:20T10C%80
ALS3-6:20T15C+80
ALS3-7:20T15C%80
ALS3-8:40T05C+80
ALS3-9:40T05C%80
ALS3-10:40T10C+80
ALS3-11:40T10C%80
ALS3-12:40T15C+80
ALS3-13:40T15C%80

Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT
D1
0%
0%
D2
5%
-20%
D3
5%
-20%
D4
10%
-20%
D5
10%
-20%
D6
15%
-20%
D7
15%
-20%
D8
5%
-40%
D9
5%
-40%
D10
10%
-40%
D11
10%
-40%
D12
15%
-40%
D13
15%
-40%

LSC ($)
1599481.83
1669615.92
1619615.92
1739750.02
1689750.02
1809884.11
1759884.11
1669615.92
1580815.92
1739750.02
1650950.02
1809884.11
1721084.11

%Δ LSC
0.00%
3.66%
0.55%
8.01%
4.91%
12.37%
9.26%
3.66%
-1.85%
8.01%
2.50%
12.37%
6.85%

Availability %Δ Avail.
79.83%
0.00%
84.52%
4.69%
79.56%
-0.27%
84.52%
4.69%
79.56%
-0.27%
84.52%
4.69%
79.56%
-0.27%
87.99%
8.16%
80.36%
0.53%
87.99%
8.16%
80.36%
0.53%
87.99%
8.16%
80.36%
0.53%

Table 12: Numerical results obtained in ALS4 for each simulation run in OPUS10
Scenario Name

Alternative Logistics
Scenario 04 (ALS4)

Scenario/Sub-Scenario Acronym
ALS4-1:OSA%80
ALS4-2:20T05C+80
ALS4-3:20T05C%80
ALS4-4:20T10C+80
ALS4-5:20T10C%80
ALS4-6:20T15C+80
ALS4-7:20T15C%80
ALS4-8:40T05C+80
ALS4-9:40T05C%80
ALS4-10:40T10C+80
ALS4-11:40T10C%80
ALS4-12:40T15C+80
ALS4-13:40T15C%80

Simulation Identifier %Δ Repair Costs %Δ TAT
E1
0%
0%
E2
5%
-20%
E3
5%
-20%
E4
10%
-20%
E5
10%
-20%
E6
15%
-20%
E7
15%
-20%
E8
5%
-40%
E9
5%
-40%
E10
10%
-40%
E11
10%
-40%
E12
15%
-40%
E13
15%
-40%

LSC ($)
1662681.85
1732815.94
1661615.94
1802950.03
1731750.03
1873084.12
1801884.12
1732815.94
1611615.94
1802950.03
1681750.03
1873084.12
1751884.12

%Δ LSC
0.00%
4.22%
-0.06%
8.44%
4.15%
12.65%
8.37%
4.22%
-3.07%
8.44%
1.15%
12.65%
5.36%

Availability %Δ Avail.
81.16%
0.00%
84.87%
3.71%
79.99%
-1.17%
84.87%
3.71%
79.99%
-1.17%
84.87%
3.71%
79.99%
-1.17%
87.43%
6.27%
80.47%
-0.69%
87.43%
6.27%
80.47%
-0.69%
87.43%
6.27%
80.47%
-0.69%

All the five logistics scenarios should be analyzed starting from the initial setup
(Simulation Identifiers equal to 1) and, for every interrelated change that occur in
TAT/RC, a pair of simulation runs were done. Thus, for example, when analyzing the
effect in the Basic Logistics Scenario (BLS) of a 20% reduction in TAT, considering a
5% increase in RC, the evaluation starts from simulation A1, and the required first step is
to run simulation A2, resulting in both higher availability and life support costs, using the
same stock allocation as in A1. The second step is to go from A2 to A3 simulation, where
a new optimal combination of availability and costs is achieved, reducing the quantities
in the assortment of items.
In the following figures, showing OPUS10 outputs for all scenarios and parameter
changes, it will be possible to graphically visualize the effects of the changes induced by
the first and second steps, always starting from the initial setup.

36

BLS Results
Figure 18 shows the output curves and points generated by OPUS10 after running
simulations for 20% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in repair costs,
comparing them with the initial setup. In Figure 19 a detailed view of the changes is
shown, keeping only the optimal points closest to the targeted availability level of 80%.

Figure 18. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in BLS

Figure 19. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in BLS
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In the same way, Figure 20 shows the output curves and points generated by
OPUS10 after running simulations for 40% TAT cuts for all three possible rises in RC,
comparing them with the initial setup. Figure 21 shows a detailed view of the changes,
retaining only the optimal points closest to the targeted availability level of 80%.

Figure 20. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in BLS

Figure 21. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in BLS
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ALS1 Results
The output curves and points produced by OPUS10 after running simulations for
20% TAT drops for all three possible increases in RC in shown in Figure 22, comparing
them with the initial situation. A detailed view of the changes is presented in Figure 23,
maintaining only the optimal points closest to the 80% availability level.

Figure 22. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1

Figure 23. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1
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Similarly, Figure 24 shows the output curves and points generated by OPUS10
after running simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three possible escalations in
repair costs, comparing them with the initial setup. Figure 25 shows a detailed view of
the changes, preserving only the optimal points closest to the availability goal of 80%.

Figure 24. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS1

Figure 25. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS1
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ALS2 Results
OPUS10 output curves and points are given by Figure 26, after running
simulations for 20% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in RC, comparing
them with the initial setup. In Figure 27 a detailed view of the changes is shown, keeping
only the optimal points nearest to the pursued availability level of 80%.

Figure 26. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS2

Figure 27. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS2
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Likewise, Figure 28 illustrates the output curves and points made by OPUS10
when running simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three possible increases in
repair costs, contrasting them with the original setup. A detailed view of the changes is
exhibited in Figure 29, retaining just the optimal points closest to the targeted availability
of 80%.

Figure 28. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS2

Figure 29. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS2
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ALS3 Results
The output given by OPUS10 after running simulations for 20% TAT decreases
for all three potential increases in repair costs is displayed in Figure 30, comparing them
with the initial system. Figure 31 presents a detailed view of the changes, keeping just the
optimal points adjacent to the 80% availability mark.

Figure 30. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS3

Figure 31. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS3
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Subsequently, Figure 32 reveals the output curves and points produced by
OPUS10 after running simulations for 40% TAT decreases for all three possible raises in
RC, contrasting them with the initial arrangement. Figure 33 illustrates a detailed picture
of the modifications, staying only the optimal points closest to the pursued availability
level of 80%.

Figure 32. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS3

Figure 33. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 4% TAT reduction in ALS3
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ALS4 Results
Figure 34 indicates the outputs offered by OPUS10 following simulation runs for
20% TAT decreases for all three possible increases in repair costs, comparing them with
the opening setup. In Figure 35 a detailed picture of the changes is displayed, keeping
only the optimal points closest to the availability target of 80%.

Figure 34. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS4

Figure 35. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 20% TAT reduction in ALS4
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Also, Figure 36 illustrates the output curves and points generated by OPUS10
after doing simulations for 40% TAT reductions for all three potential increases in repair
costs, comparing them with the initial procedure. Figure 37 shows a precise view of the
variations, maintaining only the optimal points nearest to the targeted availability level of
80%.

Figure 36. OPUS10 output C/E curves and points for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS4

Figure 37. Detailed view of the points of interest for a 40% TAT reduction in ALS4
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Analysis of the Results within Each Scenario
From the simulation outputs presented, it can be noticed that, in most cases, the
LSC will be higher when a TAT reduction is enforced in the logistics system. However,
when a TAT reduction of 40% is followed by an increase of only 5% in RC, life support
costs may even be less than in the original logistics setup.
A better view of the effects on LSC of the different tested combinations of TAT
and RC changes is provided in Figures 38 to 42. Ideally, these charts should contain only
information regarding logistical configurations corresponding to exactly the same
availability, which would be the 80% target. But this is nearly impossible in practical
terms, since the optimal cost-effectiveness curve is not continuous, but a discrete
sequence of points.
For this reason, the curves shown in the following figures are only reasonable
approximations to allow comparison, because the hypothetical accurate curves should
represent the values for exactly the same availability as the original setup. The arrows in
the charts point to the directions where the curves should be slightly moved to reflect the
same availability as the initial test configuration.
Taking Figure 38 as an example, the curve for a 20% TAT reduction should be
moved smoothly upwards, since it represents an availability 0.07% lower than the
original setup; therefore, to achieve the same level of availability, the cost would be a
little percentage higher. In the same figure, the curve for a 40% TAT reduction should be
gently moved in the opposite direction, as it is given for an availability 0.90% higher than
the initial configuration; hence, to accomplish equivalent availability the cost would be a
bit lower. The same reasoning can be applied to Figures 39 to 42.
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BLS: % Changes in LSC x % Increases in Repair Costs

% Change in LSC

12%
10%

15%, 10.11%

8%

15%, 7.68%

6%

10%, 5.72%

4%

-20% TAT

10%, 3.30%

2%

5%, 1.33%

0%

-40% TAT
5%, -1.09%

-2%

5%

10%

15%

% Increase in Repair Costs

Figure 38. BLS: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes

ALS1: % Changes in LSC x % Increases in Repair Costs

% Change in LSC

12%
10%

15%, 9.88%

8%
15%, 6.95%

6%

10%, 5.53%

4%
-20% TAT

10%, 2.60%

2%

5%, 1.18%

0%
-40% TAT

5%, -1.75%

-2%
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10%

15%

% Increase in Repair Costs

Figure 39. ALS1: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes

ALS2: % Changes in LSC x % Increases in Repair Costs

% Change in LSC

12%
10%

15%, 10.13%

8%

15%, 7.43%

6%

10%, 5.79%

4%
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10%, 2.87%
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5%, 1.45%

0%
5%, -1.48%

-2%
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10%

15%
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Figure 40. ALS2: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes
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ALS3: % Changes in LSC x % Increases in Repair Costs

% Change in LSC

10%

15%, 9.26%

8%
15%, 6.85%
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10%, 2.50%
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10%

15%

% Increase in Repair Costs

Figure 41. ALS3: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes

ALS4: % Changes in LSC x % Increases in Repair Costs

% Change in LSC
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Figure 42. ALS4: Effect on LSC of different mixes of TAT and RC changes

Another remarkable mechanism to be discussed involves the dynamics between
the first and second steps, as detailed in Figures 19 to 37. In an actual logistics system, it
is not so easy to naturally navigate among these configuration changes. If all items are
obliged to move faster in the logistics chain by reducing TAT requirements, intuitively
there will be a positive effect on availability.
However, this additional effort will certainly be accompanied by cost increases, as
discussed earlier. And considering only the parameters debated in this study, the only
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way to compensate this addition in the LSC would be to reduce the existing stock of
components available to support the fleet, otherwise they would represent an additional
cost now unnecessary, since that extra availability is not necessary: the operational
requirement is 80%, anything beyond that is just a superfluous cost.
Thus, to return to an optimal mix of LSC and availability, managers would need
to discard excess items, recovering the same amount invested in the acquisition of these
components. Despite this being an unrealistic assumption, it was taken as true for in this
study. Therefore, in a real system, it would be necessary to take into account the
depreciation costs on the items already put in service and now no longer needed, and that
would eventually be sold to some other user, or returned to the manufacturer by
recovering a portion of the amount invested in its acquisition, for example.
Again, in the real world this recapitalization process is quite complex, and even
unusual. Therefore, the chances are that costs would only increase considerably, virtually
acquiring a greater capacity to achieve higher availability rates, even though this resource
is being committed to a completely unnecessary capacity.
Comparative Results among Different Scenarios
To allow a comparison amongst all the tested logistics scenarios, OPUS10 was
used to build the chart in Figure 43, where it is possible to verify that ALS4 has the
highest intrinsic life support costs, followed by ALS2, ALS1, ALS3 and finally by BLS,
which is the most economical configuration.
On Table 13, a rough evaluation between the configurations corresponding to the
availability level closest to 80% is shown, where the same order of costs described above
can be verified. It can be seen that BLS and ALS3 have very close results, while ALS1
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and AL2 would be at a slightly higher level (with costs around 1% higher), and finally
ALS4 would result in costs significantly higher, around 4% more than the most
economical configuration. Again, it is necessary to remember that an exact comparison is
not possible, given the discrete characteristic of the output C/E curve. An interpolation
could be done to find approximate LSC values for exactly 80% availability, but the
analysis would be no different.

C/E-Curve Diagram

C/E-Curve Diagram

Availability
1.0

A1. BLS-OSA%80

B1. ALS1-OSA%80

0.8
C1. ALS2-OSA%80

D1. ALS3-OSA%80

E1. ALS4-OSA%80

0.6

0.4
1400000

1500000

1600000

1700000

1800000

Life Support Cost
Figure 43. Comparison between C/E curves for initial setups, in each logistics scenario
Table 13: Comparison among initial setup values with availability closer to 80%, in each scenario
Scenario

BLS
ALS1
ALS2
ALS3
ALS4

Scenario/SubSimulation
Scenario Acronym Identifier

LSC ($)

%Δ LSC

0.00%
0.78%
1.00%
0.08%
4.03%

BLS-1:OSA%80

A1

1598282.00

ALS1-1:OSA%80

B1

1610681.85

ALS2-1:OSA%80

C1

1614282.00

ALS3-1:OSA%80

D1

1599481.83

ALS4-1:OSA%80

E1

1662681.85
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Availability %Δ Avail.
79.98%
79.62%
79.00%
79.83%
81.16%

0.00%
-0.36%
-0.98%
-0.15%
1.18%

Another aspect to be observed here is how each of the tested logistical
configurations responds to the proposed changes in TAT and repair costs. Figure 44 and
Figure 45 are presenting the effect on LSC of the tested percentage increases in RC, for
TAT reductions of 20% and 40%, respectively.
In these illustrations, it can be clearly seen that the positive effect of reducing
TAT, compared to the negative consequences of increases in repair costs, is greater for
the ALS4 scenario than for the others. For a 20% TAT reduction, the ALS3 scenario also
presents a noticeable better response compared to the latter scenarios, but going to a 40%
TAT reduction this scenario provides results similar to ALS1, although still slightly
better than ALS2 and BLS configurations.
Therefore, there is evidence that a support organization containing more
workshops (as is the case of ALS3 and ALS4) would be more positively affected by TAT
reductions than the others, experiencing proportionally lower raises in the LSC. In
addition, there is an indication that more complex logistical configuration would respond
better to the proposed changes, given the noticeable differences between BLS and ALS4
results, for example.
Once again it is needed to remember that these charts should comprise only data
concerning logistical configurations relating to exactly the same value of 80%
availability. As debated before, this is virtually impossible in practical terms, and, due to
this reason, the curves shown in the following figures are only rough approximations to
allow comparison, since the hypothetical precise curves should display the values for
exactly the same availability than in the initial configuration. The arrows next to each
scenario identifier in the legend of Figure 44 and Figure 45 are indicating the directions
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to which the curves should be slightly translated to reflect the same availability as the
initial test configuration, according to the data provided in Tables 8 to 12.

Comparison Among All Logistics Scenarios for 20% TAT Reduction
10%
BLS

9%

% Change in LSC

8%
ALS1

7%
6%

ALS2

5%
4%

ALS3

3%
2%

ALS4

1%
0%
5%

10%

15%

% Increase in Repair Costs

Figure 44. Comparison between tested logistics scenarios, given a 20% TAT reduction

Comparison Among All Logistics Scenarios for 40% TAT Reduction
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% Change in LSC
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ALS1

4%
3%

ALS2
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1%
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0%
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-2%
-3%
5%

10%

15%
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Figure 45. Comparison between tested logistics scenarios, given a 40% TAT reduction
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Analysis of Research/Investigative Questions
After thoroughly discussing the simulation results, the research and investigative
questions proposed earlier in this study can be reviewed and discussed properly.
RQ: How sensitive are the Life Support Costs to the addition of metrics in a
Performance Based Contract?
For the conditions tested, it was possible to conclude that life support costs were
strongly sensitive to the addition of a metric that imposed a shorter turnaround time
(TAT) for the components to return from repair in any workshop, which was detailed in
the numerical results given by Tables 8 to 12. Although the magnitude is unique for every
particular scenario, the trends in percentage changes in LSC are similar among them,
with subtle differences in the slopes of the curves shown in Figures 38 to 42.
IQ1: How does imposing a metric on the maximum turn-around time to repair
a component affect LSC?
This research was able to show how the enforcement of a metric on the maximum
TAT to repair a component affected LSC, which in most cases became higher when a
lower TAT was applied. Since this obligation will certainly result in higher costs for the
contractor responsible for maintaining and transporting such components, these extra
expenses will be charged to the final costumer.
However, it was also possible to identify some simulations in which a lower LSC
was achieved, all of them when repair costs were increased by the lower amount of 5%.
This occurred for both the 20% and 40% TAT reductions tested in the ALS4 scenario,
and also in all other tested scenarios, when the 40% TAT reduction was accompanied by
only a 5% increase in RC.
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In a real logistics system, though, the reductions in turnaround times simulated in
this study would hardly correspond to such a small growth in repair costs. Therefore,
scenarios in which a reduction in LSC occurs by imposing a reduction in TAT, although
possible, are very unlikely.
IQ2: Are these possible effects more sensitive in specific logistic
configurations?
Now reviewing the comparison among the different scenarios designed for this
study, the simulation offered evidences to support the idea that more complex logistical
configurations will present a better response to TAT reductions, getting lower percentage
increases in LSC.
But while ALS4, the most complex scenario, is also the one with highest absolute
life support costs, the ALS3 configuration presented absolute LSC values very similar to
the most basic scenario (BLS), as can be seen in Figure 43 (the BLS and ALS3 curves are
practically the same). With this finding, it is possible to postulate that ALS3, the scenario
with fewer operating bases and depots, and more workshops, would be the most
recommended configuration for this logistics system, as it would have lower absolute life
support costs and would respond better to changes in the TAT/RC mix.
Expanding the Interpretation for Different Changes in Logistics Configuration
The simulation experiment created for this research only took into account only
one possible metric that could be affected by a performance-based contract design
decision: the turnaround times (TAT). Nevertheless, there are several different processes
making part of the logistics support chain that could be measured and whose desired
minimum operating parameters could be established by a contract.
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For instance, imagining a situation where fleet managers are designing a PBC to
provide almost complete logistics support to an aircraft fleet (including component repair,
supply of spare parts, obsolescence management, manpower to carry out major aircraft
inspections, among others), they could feel that not only the amount of time an item
should take to return after being sent for repair should be limited (as simulated in this
study), but also that an aircraft should not take more than, for example, 100 days in
maintenance. Worried with possible delays on the spare parts shipments, they also create
an additional metric stating that the contractor must deliver every part in not more than,
say, 50 days. Another possible concern could motivate a limitation on the maximum
number of backorders allowed, assuring a certain fill rate level. Ultimately, many other
parameters could be controlled in such a logistical support contract.
Absolutely the same reasoning used in Chapter III (Methodology) could be
applied again to assess these possible metrics impositions on the contractor. As discussed
earlier, a certain degree of adjustment in various logistical factors would be needed to
accommodate these possible parameter changes, but they would almost certainly end up
impacting, to some degree, support costs. Nearly every improvement desired in a
logistics support structure would be accompanied by an additional expense. And these
extra costs would surely be charged to the end costumer.
The case being made here is that all intermediate metrics enforced to the
contractor will act as an additional constraint, with a potential negative effect on life
support costs, unless the positive effects of adding such metrics to the logistics system
outweigh the negative consequences of cost increases, as observed in some unlikely
scenarios simulated in this study.
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For this reason, the evidences here support that managers should focus only on
demanding from contractors the performance targets truly related to the achievement of
the fleet's operational mission, like aircraft availability or, ideally, mission readiness (the
latter much more difficult to measure and demand from the contractor). When requiring
performance parameters unrelated to the final objectives, there is a prospective risk of
paying for additional logistical capacity that will be idle.
Another potential problem related to adding unreasonable metrics to a
performance-based contract can occur when payments are linked to meeting these
performance goals. If the contractor fails to achieve such unnecessary intermediate
targets, they may end up receiving less money in return for their services. And if they got
less resources to invest in fleet support, they could perform even worse. As a result, their
payments may be further reduced, and so on. This type of “death spiral” is encouraged
when intermediate metrics are increasingly adopted in performance-based contracts.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

Summary of the Research and Answers to Research Questions
A simulation experiment was planned and successfully executed in this research,
with the objective of providing quantitative evidence about the inherent mechanisms
existing in a logistics support chain affected by changes in its operating parameters. The
main idea was to replicate a possible performance-based contract design definition, in an
attempt to show how the imposition of additional performance metrics could represent an
additional challenge for contractors and costumers to achieve the desired results for an
operational fleet.
In seeking to answer the proposed research questions, it was possible to find
indications that life support costs are strongly sensitive to the addition of new metrics to a
performance-based contract, as was observed in the simulations when testing logistics
responses to changes in turnaround times and repair costs.
In most cases, the expenses to sustain the logistics system became higher when
enforcing lower TAT, considering the related increases in repair costs to meet such
demand. Nevertheless, it was also found the possibility of obtaining lower sustainment
costs when requiring a lower time to get the components back from repair, but the
conditions for this to occur are considered unlikely, requiring much faster deliveries with
increases of only 5% in unit repair costs.
For the conditions tested, more complex support organizations also performed
better when subjected to changes in the mix TAT/repair costs, with slightly lower
percentage increases in life support costs. And among all the tested logistics scenarios,
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the one with fewer operational bases and depots, and more workshops, it was the one that
presented a better combination between lower absolute LSC and response to fluctuations
in escalating unit repair costs due to faster delivery obligations.
Significance of Research
There is a vast amount of literature addressing Performance Based Logistics and
its correlated theme Performance Based Contracting, but at the same time a lack of
quantitative studies within these areas.
On the latter topic, much has been said about its possible benefits and how it can
enhance the logistics chain to deliver better results than in the conventional transactionbased approach, but scarce studies report the practical challenges associated with setting
performance requirements.
Hence, this research contributes by providing quantitative indications on the
intrinsic mechanisms concerned with the contract design definitions, advising logistics
managers with measurable evidence regarding the side effects that the imposition of
performance metrics can have on life support costs.
More than that, it offers an approach that can be reproduced in future studies that
deal with complementary analysis on this subject, or even for leaders who seek to make
more enlightened judgments in actual cases.
Recommendations for Actions
The main takeaway identified in this research is that decisions about performance
metrics should be extremely cautious, given the inherent jeopardy associated with such
additional requirements. Based on the findings reported here, evidence was produced
indicating that performance-based contracts should preferentially define only goals more
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directly related to the final objective of an aircraft fleet, like system availability or,
ideally, mission readiness, which is harder to measure and demand from the contractor
because it involves the uncertainty of operational schedule.
If strictly necessary, intermediate metrics must be applied carefully and after a
detailed assessment aiming to identify the current operating characteristic of the existing
logistical support system, in an effort to eventually requiring, as far as possible, the
maintenance of the ruling logistical parameters, avoiding a need for a sharp readjustment
of the logistics support structure, thus reducing the possible negative effects of such inbetween metrics.
Recommendations for Future Research
Several improvements can be done using this study as a starting point. More
specific logistics scenarios could be used, allowing bases to be used as warehouses or
enabling lateral support, for example. Base and depot-level maintenance could also be
added as possibilities in the logistics support structure.
Different cost families could also be considered, adding depreciation rates,
reorder costs, storage and transportation expenses, among others. Hereupon, this research
did not consider the possible promising effects of the allowed inventory reduction
induced by faster turnaround times, which would act positively by reducing, for instance,
depreciation and storage costs.
Also, the use of real data in the analysis would be a great challenge, for the
reasons discussed in previous chapters, but it would certainly be an amazing opportunity
for complementary research.
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A final suggestion would be to expand this analysis to different types of metrics
that could be used in performance-based contract, using different experiences from
previous contracts. Thus, for example, in an agreement in which the contractor is
responsible for carrying out all the maintenances of the aircraft, a metric that imposes a
maximum period of time for each type of maintenance could certainly be specified by the
procurement team. And this would be another interesting research case, which could be
assessed employing the simulation tools used in this study or even another methodology.
The risks in such situation would be similar to those faced in this research, but only a
dedicated study would be able to identify whether the life support cost inherent in that
support organization would be strongly affected by those metric changes or not.
Conclusions of Research
This study was able to provide evidences about the prospective side effects that
may arise from unfounded decisions regarding performance metrics when designing a
performance-based contract. It became clear by what means a simple change in the
logistics system requirements can lead to a significant increase in life support costs, and
how this effect can vary depending on the support organization structure.
The rationale discussed in this research can guide administrators to make more
informed judgments in the logistics support planning process. The specification of inbetween performance parameters may seem interesting and even tempting while
negotiating performance-based agreements with contractors, giving the impression of
creating a more robust supply chain.
However, managers must keep in mind the potential risks of acquiring additional
unused logistics capacity at a high price. In addition, if payments to the contractor are
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penalized for not reaching such unnecessary goals, the logistics support may be not only
more expensive, but can also be impaired in the medium to long-term, all of which result
from a motivation without real need.
Even in hypothetical scenarios where there is a theoretical possibility of reducing
life support costs by adopting additional intermediate metrics, there will be some
practical infeasibility in getting rid of the eventual extra allocation of inventory that will
emerge with the adoption of improved logistics parameters. As a consequence, it is likely
that the logistics system will end up with idle capacity, synonymous with inappropriate
use of resources.
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